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OPINION OF THE COURT 
______________ 
 
VANASKIE, Circuit Judge. 
 Appellant Malachi Glass appeals his criminal sentence, 
in particular the District Court’s application of a career-
offender enhancement under the United States Sentencing 
Guidelines (“U.S.S.G.”) § 4B1.1.  We will affirm.  
I. 
 Glass pleaded guilty to one count of possession with 
intent to distribute cocaine hydrochloride in violation of 21 
U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).  At Glass’s sentencing hearing, the District 
Court applied a career-offender enhancement pursuant to 
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U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1.  The enhancement was based on two prior 
state convictions under 35 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 780-113(a)(30)—
one from 2001, CP-22-CR-2630-2001; and one from 2004, 
CP-31-CR-460-2004.  Despite the enhancement, the District 
Court applied a downward variance.  The District Court based 
the variance primarily on the observation that the pre-sentence 
investigation report (“PSR”) overstated the seriousness of 
Glass’s criminal past.  The District Court also justified varying 
downward by citing Glass’s significant family responsibilities, 
his drug addiction, and his relatively young age.  The District 
Court ultimately imposed a prison term of 132 months.  
 Glass filed a timely notice of appeal, challenging the 
career-offender enhancement.  We appointed appellate 
counsel.  In July 2017, this Court denied appointed counsel’s 
motion to withdraw under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 
(1967), recognizing that Glass had raised two non-frivolous 
arguments concerning the use of his state court convictions as 
predicates for a sentencing enhancement under the Sentencing 
Guidelines’ career criminal provisions.1  The Court then 
appointed new appellate counsel and ordered the parties to 
brief the merits of the appeal.  We address the merits of Glass’s 
appeal below. 
II. 
                                              
1 Under Anders, “if counsel finds his [client’s] case to 
be wholly frivolous, after a conscientious examination of it, 
he should so advise the court and request permission to 
withdraw.”  386 U.S. at 744. 
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 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 
U.S.C. § 3231.  We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 
1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742.   
The parties dispute which standard of review should 
govern our analysis.  Glass argues he preserved his challenge 
to the career-offender enhancement, which would trigger de 
novo review.  Alternatively, he claims he did not waive his 
challenge and, at the very least, plain error review should 
apply.  On the other hand, the government contends that Glass 
either waived or forfeited his challenge, permitting us to 
disregard his argument or review it for plain error, respectively.   
While it is true that Glass made several arguments 
regarding his criminal history to the District Court, Glass failed 
to challenge the inclusion of his convictions as predicate 
offenses for career-offender purposes prior to appeal.  Even 
Glass’s first appellate counsel acknowledged that trial counsel 
had conceded the issue and thus, plain error review should 
apply.  In light of Glass’s trial counsel’s repeated concessions 
that Glass was a career offender, we think it appropriate to 
review the imposition of the career-offender enhancement for 
plain error.  See United States v. Dahl, 833 F.3d 345, 357 (3d 
Cir. 2016) (applying plain error review “because Dahl did not 
object to the application of [a sentencing enhancement] on the 
grounds he asserts here”).   
“To demonstrate ‘plain error’ an appellant bears the 
burden of proving that: (1) the court erred; (2) the error was 
‘plain’ at the time of appellate consideration; and (3) the error 
affected substantial rights, usually meaning that the error ‘must 
have affected the outcome of the district court proceedings.’”  
Gov’t of the Virgin Islands v. Rosa, 399 F.3d 283, 293 (3d Cir. 
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2005) (quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734 
(1993)). 
III. 
As relevant here, a defendant qualifies for a career-
offender enhancement under the Guidelines if he or she “has at 
least two prior felony convictions of . . . a controlled substance 
offense.”  U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a).  A “controlled substance 
offense” is an offense that (1) is punishable by a term of 
imprisonment that exceeds one year and (2) “prohibits the 
manufacture, import, export, distribution, or dispensing of a 
controlled substance (or a counterfeit substance) or the 
possession of a controlled substance (or a counterfeit 
substance) with intent to manufacture, import, export, 
distribute, or dispense.”  Id. § 4B1.2(b).  A state conviction 
cannot qualify as a “controlled substance offense” if its 
elements are broader than those listed in § 4B1.2(b).  See 
Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2251 (2016) (holding, 
in the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”) context, that “a 
state crime cannot qualify as . . . [a] predicate if its elements 
are broader than those of a listed generic offense”); see also 
United States v. Hinkle, 832 F.3d 569, 574 (5th Cir. 2016) 
(applying Mathis to analysis of § 4B1.1).2 
Glass’s career-offender enhancement was based on two 
convictions under 35 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 780-113(a)(30).  Glass 
argues that a violation of § 780-113(a)(30) is broader than the 
Guidelines’ definition of a “controlled substance offense” to 
                                              
2 The parties agree that, with some exceptions not 
relevant here, cases concerning overbreadth of a state 
criminal statute in the context of the ACCA also apply to the 
career-offender context. 
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the extent it criminalizes a mere offer to sell drugs.  We have 
yet to determine whether or in what circumstances state 
statutes that criminalize offers to sell constitute “controlled 
substance offenses” under the Guidelines.  Increasingly, 
however, our sister Circuits have held state statutes expressly 
criminalizing a mere “offer” do not.  See, e.g., United States v. 
Madkins, 866 F.3d 1136, 1147 (10th Cir. 2017) (concluding 
Kansas law criminalized offers to sell and thus, swept beyond 
§ 4B1.2(b)); Hinkle, 832 F.3d at 572 (noting government’s 
concession that if Texas law covered mere offers, it would not 
come within the definition of “controlled substance offense” 
under § 4B1.2); United States v. Savage, 542 F.3d 959, 965–
66 (2d Cir. 2008) (concluding Connecticut statute that reached 
fraudulent offers to sell criminalized more conduct than § 
4B1.2(b)); see also United States v. Redden, 875 F.3d 374, 375 
(7th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 1343 (2018) (granting 
Anders motion where it was clear that Illinois law did not 
criminalize offers to sell); United States v. Bryant, 571 F.3d 
147, 158 (1st Cir. 2009) (concluding New York law that 
criminalized only bona fide offers, i.e., offers that 
demonstrated an intent and ability to sell, did not sweep beyond 
§ 4B1.2).  
Assuming a state statute that criminalizes a mere offer 
to sell sweeps beyond U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2, we are not convinced 
the statute at issue here—§ 780-113(a)(30)—crosses that line.  
Section 780-113(a)(30) prohibits “the manufacture, delivery, 
or possession with intent to manufacture or deliver, a 
controlled substance . . . or knowingly creating, delivering or 
possessing with intent to deliver, a counterfeit controlled 
substance.”  It does not mention offers to sell drugs.   
 Glass argues, however, that a mere offer to sell drugs is 
impliedly included in § 780-113(a)(30) because Pennsylvania 
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law goes on to define “deliver” as “the actual, constructive, or 
attempted transfer from one person to another of a controlled 
substance . . . .”  35 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 780-102(b).  We disagree.   
First, Glass omits that the federal counterpart to this 
statute, the Controlled Substances Act (CSA), also defines the 
“delivery” of a controlled substance to mean “the actual, 
constructive, or attempted transfer of a controlled substance,” 
21 U.S.C. § 802(8), and the Guidelines’ application note too 
states that the term “controlled substance offense” applies not 
only to a statute that bars distribution of controlled substances, 
but also to “the offenses of aiding and abetting, conspiring, and 
attempting to commit such offenses.”  U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2 cmt. 
n.1 (emphasis added).  As Glass does not dispute that “attempt” 
under Pennsylvania law has the same meaning as “attempt” in 
the CSA and the Guidelines, his argument, if accepted, would 
prove self-defeating, for if § 780-102(b) sweeps in mere offers 
to sell, then by his logic, so does 21 U.S.C. § 802(8) and 
U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2, making the state offense broad, but no 
broader then the federal one.3 
Second, we note that at least one other provision 
contained in § 780-113 expressly prohibits offers.  See 35 Pa. 
Cons. Stat. § 780-113(a)(1) (“The manufacture, sale or 
                                              
3 In pointing out this flaw in the logic of Glass’s 
argument, we are not suggesting that “attempted transfer” in 
21 U.S.C. § 802(8) includes offers or solicitations other than 
those that meet the requirements for “attempt” under the 
CSA.  Consistent with the Model Penal Code, federal 
“attempt” requires intent and a substantial step towards the 
commission of the crime.  See United States v. Cruz-Jiminez, 
977 F.2d 95, 101–03 (3d Cir. 1992); Model Penal Code § 
5.01. 
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delivery, holding, offering for sale, or possession of any 
controlled substance . . . .” (emphasis added)).  This 
language—i.e., “offering for sale”—is conspicuously absent 
from § 780-113(a)(30).  Obviously, the Pennsylvania 
legislature knew how to criminalize offers; it simply chose not 
to in § 780-113(a)(30).     
Third, the parties have failed to uncover any authority, 
such as state judicial decisions or pattern jury instructions, 
suggesting Pennsylvania would prosecute a mere offer to sell 
under § 780-113(a)(30).  See Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez, 549 
U.S. 183, 193 (2007) (“[T]o find that a state statute creates a 
crime outside the generic definition . . . requires a realistic 
probability, not a theoretical possibility, that the State would 
apply its statute to conduct that falls outside the generic 
definition of a crime.”).   
And fourth, contrary to Glass’s argument, we are not 
convinced Pennsylvania’s definition of “deliver” is sufficiently 
similar to the Texas definition at issue in Hinkle and Conley 
such that a similar outcome is warranted.  Under the Texas 
Health and Safety Code, “deliver” means: “to transfer, actually 
or constructively, to another a controlled substance, counterfeit 
substance, or drug paraphernalia, regardless of whether there 
is an agency relationship.  The term includes offering to sell a 
controlled substance, counterfeit substance, or drug 
paraphernalia.”  Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 481.002(8) 
(emphasis added).  The Texas Code expressly reaches offers, 
whereas Pennsylvania’s definition fails to include similar 
language.  If anything, the Pennsylvania definition of “deliver” 
is more similar to the definition of “deliver” under Illinois law, 
which the Seventh Circuit concluded did not encompass offers 
to sell.  See Redden, 875 F.3d at 375 (“The definition . . . tells 
us that ‘deliver’ and ‘delivery’ mean an ‘actual, constructive or 
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attempted transfer’ . . . .  Any conduct meeting the state’s 
definition of ‘delivery’ comes within § 4B1.2(b) because 
‘transfer’ is just another word for distribute or dispense.”).  
Accordingly, we are confident concluding that § 780-
113(a)(30) is not broader than the Guidelines’ definition of a 
“controlled substance offense.”   
We note that this conclusion is consistent with our prior 
holdings regarding § 730-113(a)(30) outside the U.S.S.G. § 
4B1.1 context.  We have already held that conviction under 
§ 780-113(a)(30) for cocaine-based offenses is not overbroad 
in the context of the ACCA’s definition of “serious drug 
offense.”  See United States v. Abbott, 748 F.3d 154, 160 (3d 
Cir. 2014).  Additionally, we have held that conviction under § 
780-113(a)(30) for a cocaine-based offense is “analogous to 
the federal felony of possession with intent to distribute . . . 
prohibited by [21 U.S.C.] § 841(a)(1) of the Controlled 
Substances Act,” and is therefore an “aggravated felony” under 
the Immigration and Nationality Act.  Avila v. Attorney 
General, 826 F.3d 662, 668 (3d Cir. 2016). 
In sum, because § 780-113(a)(30) does not sweep more 
broadly than § 4B1.2, it is a “controlled substance offense” and 
may serve as a predicate offense to a career-offender 
enhancement under § 4B1.1.  Because the record shows that 
Glass possessed two such predicate offenses—(1) a 2001 
conviction, CP-22-CR-2630-2001, for manufacturing, 
delivering, or possessing marijuana in Dauphin County; and 
(2) a 2004 conviction, CP-31-CR-461-2004, for 
manufacturing, delivering, or possessing cocaine in 
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Huntingdon County—we find no error in the District Court’s 
decision to apply the enhancement.4  
IV. 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District 
Court’s judgment entered on June 13, 2016.   
                                              
4 We recognize that the District Court based the 
enhancement on convictions CP-22-CR-2630-2001 and CP-
31-CR-460-2004.  Glass also argues that the latter conviction 
is not a “controlled substance offense” because it was for 
simple possession.  We need not consider this argument 
because the record shows Glass possessed a third § 780-
113(a)(30) conviction, CP-31-CR-461-2004, which qualifies 
as a predicate offense under today’s decision.  See United 
States v. Blair, 734 F.3d 218, 222 (3d Cir. 2013) (citing 
United States v. Berrios, 676 F.3d 118, 129 (3d Cir. 2012)).  
